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The Complexity of Student-Project-Resource
Matching-Allocation Problems
ANISSE ISMAILI
In this work, we consider a three sided student-project-resource matching-allocation problem, in which stu-
dents have preferences on projects, and projects on students. While students are many-to-one matched to
projects, indivisible resources are many-to-one allocated to projects whose capacities are thus endogenously
determined by the sum of resources allocated to them. Traditionally, this problem is divided into two separate
problems: (1) resources are allocated to projects based on some expectations (resource allocation problem),
and (2) students are matched to projects based on the capacities determined in the previous problem (match-
ing problem). Although both problems are well-understood, unless the expectations used in the first problem
are correct, we obtain a suboptimal outcome. Thus, it is desirable to solve this problem as a whole without
dividing it in two.
Here, we show that finding a nonwasteful matching is FPNP[log]-hard, and deciding whether a stable
matching exists is NPNP-complete. These results involve two new problems of independent interest: Pare-
toPartition, shown FPNP[poly]-complete and strongly FPNP[log]-hard, and ∀∃-4-Partition, shown strongly
NPNP-complete.
1 MODEL
In this section, we introduce necessary definitions and notations.
Definition 1.1 (Student-Project-Resource (SPR) Instance). It is a tuple (S, P,R, ≻S , ≻P ,TR ,qR ).
• S = {s1, . . . , s |S |} is a set of students.
• P = {p1, . . . ,p |P |} is a set of projects.
• R = {r1, . . . , r |R |} is a set of resources.
• ≻S= (≻s )s ∈S are the students’ preferences over set P ∪ {∅}.
• ≻P= (≻p )p ∈P are the projects’ preferences over set S ∪ {∅}.
• Resource r has capacity qr ∈ N>0, and qR = (qr )r ∈R .
• Resource r is compatible with Tr ⊆ P , and TR = (Tr )r ∈R .
For soundness,1 every preference ≻p may extend to 2
S in a non-specified manner such that:
• ∀s, s ′ ∈ S,∀S ′ ⊆ S \ {s, s ′}, s ≻p s
′ ⇔ S ′ ∪ {s} ≻p S
′ ∪ {s ′} (responsiveness) and
• ∀s ∈ S,∀S ′ ⊆ S \ {s}, s ≻p ∅ ⇔ S
′ ∪ {s} ≻p S
′ (separability).
Contract (s,p) ∈ S × P means that student s is matched to project p. Contract (s,p) is acceptable
for student s (resp. project p) if p ≻s ∅ holds (resp. s ≻p ∅). The contract is acceptable when both
hold. W.l.o.g., we define set of contracts X ⊆ S × P by (s,p) ∈ X if and only if it is acceptable for
p.2
1Without these properties, this work is still valid, though a claiming or envious pair (s, p)may not necessarily make sense.
2For designing a strategyproof mechanism, we assume each ≻s is private information of s , while the rest of parameters
are public. Thus, X does not need to be part of the input, since it is characterized by projects’ preferences.
Individual subpart of manuscript submitted for review to ACM Economics & Computation 2019 (EC ’19).
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Definition 1.2 (Matching). A matching is a subset Y ⊆ X , where for every student s ∈ S , subset
Ys = {(s,p) ∈ Y | p ∈ P} satisfies |Ys | ≤ 1, and either
• Ys = ∅, or
• Ys = {(s,p)} and p ≻s ∅, holds.
For a matching Y , let Y (s) ∈ P ∪ {∅} denote the project s is matched, and Y (p) ⊆ S denote the set
of students assigned to project p.
Definition 1.3 (Allocation). An allocation µ : R → P maps each resource r to a project µ(r ) ∈ Tr .
(A resource is indivisible.) Let qµ (p) =
∑
r ∈µ−1(p) qr .
3
Definition 1.4 (Feasibility). A feasible matching (Y , µ) is a couple of a matching and an allocation
where for every project p ∈ P , it holds that |Y (p)| ≤ qµ (p).
In other words, matching Y is feasible with allocation µ if each project p is allocated enough
resources by µ to accommodate Y (p). We say Y is feasible if there exists µ such that (Y , µ) is
feasible.
Traditionally (e.g. with fixed quotas), for feasible matching (Y , µ) and (s,p) ∈ X \ Y , we say
student s claims an empty seat of p if p ≻s Y (s) andmatchingY \{(s,Y (s))}∪{(s,p)} is feasible with
same allocation µ . However, in our setting [13], since the distributional constraint is endogenous
and as flexible as allocations are, the definition of nonwastefulness uses this flexibility, as follows.
Definition 1.5 (Nonwastefulness). Given feasible matching (Y , µ), a contract (s,p) ∈ X \ Y is a
claiming pair if and only if:
• student s has preference p ≻s Y (s), and
• matching Y \ {(s,Y (s))} ∪ {(s,p)} is feasible with some possibly new allocation µ ′.
A feasible matching (Y , µ) is nonwasteful if it has no claiming pair.
In other words, (s,p) is a claiming pair if it is possible to move s to a more preferred project p
while keeping the assignment of other students unchanged with allocation µ ′. Note that µ ′ can be
different from µ . Thus, (s,p) can be a claiming pair even if moving her to p is impossible with the
current allocation µ , but it becomes possible with a different/better allocation µ ′.
Definition 1.6 (Fairness). Given feasible matching (Y , µ), contract (s,p) ∈ X \ Y is an envious
pair if and only if:
• student s has preference p ≻s Y (s), and
• there exists student s ′ ∈ Y (p) such that p prefers s ≻p s
′.4
We also say s has justified envy toward s ′ when the above conditions hold. A feasible matching
(Y , µ) is fair if it has no envious pair (equivalently, no student has justified envy).
In other words, student s has justified envy toward s ′, if s ′ is assigned to project p, although s
prefers p over her current project Y (s) and project p also prefers s over s ′.
Definition 1.7 (Stability). A feasible matching (Y , µ) is stable if it is nonwasteful and fair (no
claiming/envious pair).
Definition 1.8 (Pareto Efficiency). Matching Y is Pareto dominated by Y ′ if all students weakly
prefer Y ′ over Y and at least one student strictly prefers Y ′. A feasible matching is Pareto efficient
if no feasible matching Pareto dominates it.
3For µ−1(p) = ∅, we assume that an empty sum equals zero.
4Note that matching (Y \ {(s, Y (s)), (s ′, Y (s ′))}) ∪ {(s, p)} is still feasible with same allocation µ .
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Pareto efficiency implies nonwastefulness (not vice versa).
Definition 1.9 (Mechanism). Given any SPR instance, a mechanism outputs a feasible matching
(Y , µ). If a mechanism always obtains a feasible matching that satisfies property A (e.g., fairness),
we say this mechanism is A (e.g., fair). A mechanism is strategyproof if no student gains by report-
ing a preference different from her true one.
An SPR belongs to a general class of problems, where distributional constraints satisfy a condi-
tion called heredity5 [13]. Two general strategyproof mechanisms exist in this context [13]. First,
Serial Dictatorship (SD) obtains a Pareto efficient (thus also nonwasteful) matching. SD matches
students one by one, based on a fixed ordering. Let Y denote the current (partial) matching. For
next student s from the fixed order, SD chooses (s,p) ∈ X and add it to Y , where p is her most
preferred project s.t. Y ∪ {(s,p)} is feasible with some allocation µ ′. Unfortunately, SD is computa-
tionally expensive6 and unfair. Second, Artificial Caps Deferred Acceptance (ACDA) obtains a fair
matching in polynomial-time. The idea is to fix a resource allocation µ and run the well-known De-
ferred Acceptance (DA) [9]. In DA, each student first applies to her most preferred project. Then
each project deferred accepts applicants up to its capacity limit based on its preference and the
rest of the students are rejected. Then a rejected student applies to her second choice, and so on.7
However, ACDA is inefficient since µ is chosen independently from students’ preferences.
Example 1.10. Nonwastefulness and fairness are incompatible since there exists an instancewith
no stable matching. Let us show a simple example with two students sa, sb , two projects pa,pb ,
and a unitary resource compatible with both. Students’ preferences are pa ≻sa pb and pb ≻sb pa .
Projects’ are sb ≻pa sa and sa ≻pb sb . By symmetry, assume the resource is allocated to pa . From
fairness, sb must be allocated to pa . Then (sb ,pb ) becomes a claiming pair.
8
2 THE COMPLEXITY OF SPR
In this section, we study the computational complexity of the problems defined below.
Definition 2.1 (Computational problems).
• SPR/FA: Given an SPR instance and a matching Y , does an allocation µ exist such that (Y , µ)
is a feasible matching?
• SPR/Nw/Verif: Given an SPR instance and a feasible matching (Y , µ), is it nonwasteful?
• SPR/Nw/Find: Given an SPR instance, find a nonwasteful matching (Y , µ).
• SPR/Stable/Verif: Given an SPR instance and a feasible matching, is it stable?
• SPR/Stable/Exist: Given an SPR instance, does a stable matching exist?
Reminder (Computational Complexity). We assume the following common knowledge: (decision)
problem, length function, classes P, NP, complementation, hardness and completeness. An SPR
instance has length Θ(|S | |P | + |P | |R |).
A number problem is said strongly hard if its hardness holds even when restricting to instances
whose numbers are polynomially bounded. For instance, NP-complete problem Partition (as well
as SubsetSum or Knapsack) admits an algorithm polynomial in its largest number; hence, it is not
5Heredity means that if matching Y is feasible, then any of its subsets are also feasible. An SPR satisfies this property.
6It requires to solve SPR/FA (see below)O ( |X |) times.
7Each project deferred accepts applying students, without distinguishing newly applied and already deferred accepted
students.
8We use this example as a building block in the next section.
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strongly hard. However, problem 4-Partition is NP-hard even when its numbers are polynomially
bounded [10]. Therefore, it is a strongly NP-hard problem.
While a decision problem only allows for one {0, 1} (no/yes) output, a function problem allows
for an entire {0, 1}-word (hence, any finite discrete object, or w.l.o.g. an integer). A function prob-
lem in class FPNP[poly] (resp. FPNP[log]) can be solved by a polynomial (resp. logarithmic) number
of calls to an NP-oracle. Typically, any optimization problemwhose decision version (whether a so-
lution better than a threshold exists) is in NP, is in FPNP[poly] or FPNP[log]: one finds the optimum
by a binary search that calls the decision version. It is usually polynomial in the number of bits
for numbers, but when instances have no numbers then the binary search is typically logarithmic.
Hardness in these classes is induced by metric reductions from function problem Π to Π′, where
finding the output for Π′ in polynomial time provides the output for Π in polynomial time.
Class NP is the class of problems whose yes-instances admit a certificate (e.g. a solution) that
can be verified in polynomial-time. When the verification procedure requires an NP-oracle, the
problem is in class NPNP. Class coNP (resp. coNPNP) is the complement of class NP (resp. NPNP).
Let us start by simply observing how brute-force methods depend on the parameters of these
problems. At first glance, there areO(|P | |S | )matchings andO(|P | |R | ) resource allocations.Whether
a matching Y is feasible by some allocation can be decided using dynamic programming on sub-
problems Tk (κ1, . . . ,κ |P |) ∈ {false, true} (for integers 0 ≤ k ≤ |R | and 0 ≤ κp ≤ |S |) which
ask whether some allocation can provide κp seats for each p ∈ P , using only resources {r1, . . . , rk }.
There areO
(
|R | |S | |P |
)
subproblems. Each subproblem can be solved in timeO(|P |) by the following
recurrence. First, T0(κ) = {true if κ ≡ 0, false otherwise}, and second, for k > 0 and κ ∈ [0,n]
p ,
Tk (κ) =
∨p
i=1 |κi ≥qrk
Tk−1(κ1, . . . ,κi − qrk , . . . ,κp ), both hold. Therefore, the dynamic program
takes time O(|S | |P | |P | |R |), including a last iteration that queries for an allocation with at least the
required numbers of seats (rather than exactly). Consequently:
• SPR/FA can be decided in time O(|S | |P | |P | |R |),
• SPR/Nw/Find can be solved in time O(|S | |P |+1 |P |2 |R |) by mechanism SD, and
these two problems are XP-tractable with respect to parameter |P | (while stability seems harder to
decide). A verification problem SPR/FA decidable in polynomial-time would contain our problems
to class NP. However, this is not the case in general, as the following theorem shows.
Theorem 2.2. SPR/FA is NP-complete.
Proof. Since an allocation µ that makes (Y , µ) a feasible matching is an efficiently verifiable
certificate for yes-instances, SPR/FA belongs to NP. For hardness, any instance of 4-Partition,
defined by positive integers multisetW = {w1, . . . ,w4m} and target θ ∈ N (with
∑
w ∈W w = mθ
and ∀i ∈ [4m], θ5 < wi <
θ
3 ) is reduced to an instance of SPR/FA with m projects p1, . . . ,pm .
In the given matching Y , θ students are matched to each project. Resources R are identified with
weightsW : qR = (w1, . . . ,w4m) andTr = P for every r ∈ R. The correspondence is straightforward
between a partition ofW into m subsets of size 4 that hit θ , and an allocation with capacity for
θ students onm projects (hence 4 resources per project). Crucially, since 4-Partition is NP-hard
even if its integers are polynomially bounded, so is the number of students and the reduction is
polynomial. 
Intricate complexity results follow from the hardness of feasibility.9 Also, in Th. 2.2, the strong
NP-hardness of 4-Partition is necessary: a similar construction fromPartitionwith two projects
9It tends to push problems to be strictly harder than NP.
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θ students
.
..
θ students
mθ students
mθ +m students
Projects:
p1
pm
pm+1
pm+2
θ + 1
.
..
θ + 1
w1 . . . w4m
mθ +m − 1
Resources:
rx1
rxm
ri
rz
4-Partition?
Fig. 1. Reducing 4-Partition to SPR/Nw/Verif. Students specified in project boxes are the students that are
acceptable for each project. While the horizontal resource allocation makes almost all capacity requirements
feasible, one more student can be matched to pm+2 if and only if the dashed resource allocation (with a
solution to 4-Partition) is feasible.
would require exponentially many students, hence the reduction would not be polynomial. There-
fore, we need to create ParetoPartition and ∀∃-4-Partition and show them strongly hard, so
our reductions have polynomially many students.
Definition 2.3 (New fundamental problems).
• ParetoPartition:
Given positive integer multisetW = {w1, . . . ,w |W |}, a number m ∈ N of desired subsets,
and target θ ∈ N, any partition ofW into a list V1, . . . ,Vm ofm subsets is mapped to deficit
vector δ ∈ Zm that is defined for every10 i ∈ [m] by:
δi = min {w(Vi ) − θ , 0} ,
wherew(Vi) =
∑
w ∈Vi w . (SubsetVi has negative deficit if it sums below θ , and deficit zero if
it surpasses θ .) The problem is to find one partition ofW intom subsets whose deficit vector
δ is Pareto efficient11 within the deficit vectors of all partitions ofW .
• ∀∃-4-Partition:
Given target θ ∈ N, list of integersW = (w1, . . . ,w4m) s.t.
θ
5 < wi <
θ
3 and list of disjoint
couples L = (u1,v1), . . . , (uℓ,vℓ) fromW , for map σ : [ℓ] → {0, 1}, a partition ofW intom
subsets V1, . . . ,Vm is σ -satisfying if and only if:
– ∀i ∈ [m], |Vi | = 4 andw(Vi ) = θ ,
– ∀i ∈ [ℓ], ui ∈ Vi and ∀i ∈ [ℓ], vi ∈ Vi if and only if σ (i) = 1.
(Thus, ui and vi are together in Vi if and only if σ (i) = 1.) The question is: Does, for every
map σ : [ℓ] → {0, 1}, a σ -satisfying partition ofW intom subsets exist?
2.1 The Complexity of Nonwastefulness
Here we first show that there is no natural verification procedure that would make computing a
nonwasteful matching12 belong to NP. Indeed, we then show that SPR/Nw/Find is FPNP[log]-hard:
one can embed a logarithmic number of calls to SAT in a single call to SPR/Nw/Find, which is
strictly harder than NP.
Theorem2.4. SPR/Nw/Verif is coNP-complete, even if each student only has one acceptable project.
10[m] is shorthand of {1, . . . ,m }.
11Given two vectors δ, δ ′ ∈ Zm , vector δ Pareto dominates δ ′ if and only if: ∀i ∈ [m], δi ≥ δ
′
i and ∃i ∈ [m], δi > δ
′
i .
For a set of vectors ∆ and δ ∈ ∆, δ is Pareto efficient in ∆ when no other vector δ ′ ∈ ∆ Pareto dominates it.
12whose existence is guaranteed by mechanism SD
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Proof. Claiming pair (s,p) and allocation µ ′ that makes it feasible are efficiently verifiable
no-certificates. Hence, SPR/Nw/Verif is in coNP. To show coNP-hardness, any instance W =
{w1, . . . ,w4m} of 4-Partition with target θ (assuming
∑
w ∈W w = mθ and
θ
5 < wi <
θ
3 ) is re-
duced to the following co-instance, whose yes-answers are for existent claiming pairs (see Fig. 1).
There are m + 2 projects. For i ∈ [m], θ students only consider pi acceptable, mθ students only
consider pm+1 acceptable, andmθ +m only consider pm+2 acceptable. Projects also rank the cor-
responding students acceptable, arbitrarily. In matching Y , all students are matched except one
student s∗, who wanted pm+2. In allocation µ , for every i ∈ [m], project pi receives resource rxi
with capacity qrxi = θ + 1 and Trxi = {pi ,pm+2}. Project pm+1 receives 4m resources ri identified
with integer setW = {w1, . . . ,w4m}: for every i ∈ [4m], resource ri has capacity qri = wi and
Tri = {pi | i ∈ [m + 1]}. Project pm+2 receives resource rz with capacity qrz = mθ +m − 1 and
Trz = {pm+1,pm+2}. Since integers wi and θ are polynomially bounded, so is the number of stu-
dents, and the reduction is polynomial-time. There exists a solution V1, . . . ,Vm to 4-Partition if
and only if allocation µ ′ (dashed in Figure 1) is feasible, i.e. (s∗,pm+2) is a claiming pair. 
Theorem 2.5. SPR/Nw/Find belongs to FPNP[poly] and is FPNP[log]-hard, even if each student only
has a single acceptable project.
Proof. Mechanism SD shows that SPR/Nw/Find belongs to FPNP[poly]. Hardness follows from
Lemmas 2.6 and 2.7 below. 
Lemma 2.6. ParetoPartition is FPNP[poly]-complete and strongly FPNP[log]-hard.
Proof. ParetoPartition (a partition intom subsets targeting θ ) belongs to FPNP[poly]. Indeed
a Leximax partition (thus Pareto efficient) can be found by making a polynomial number of calls to
an NP-oracle on the following subproblem: Given one deficit per subset δ1, . . . , δm , decide whether
a mapping fromW to subsetsV1, . . . ,Vm exists, such that deficits are greater or equal to δ1, . . . , δm .
A Leximax partition can be found by iterating onVi fromV1 toVm . Assuming the first components
δ1, . . . , δi−1 of a Leximax Pareto efficient partition were previously fixed by iterations V1 to Vi−1
and δi+1 = . . . = δm = −θ , we set δi to the best feasible deficit for Vi by a binary search in [−θ , 0]
using the NP-oracle on the subproblem above.
Let any instance of Max3DM be defined by finite sets A,B,C with |A| = |B | = |C | = d and
triplets set N ⊆ A × B × C , |N | = n. Triplet t = (a,b, c) ∈ N is mapped to payoff vt ∈ N. In a
(partial) 3-dimensional matching (3DM) N ′ ⊆ N , any element of A ∪ B ∪ C occurs at most once.
The goal is to maximize
∑
t ∈N ′ vt for N
′ ⊆ N any (partial) 3-dimensional matching. Note that
maximizing −
∑
t ∈N ′\N vt is an equivalent goal. This problem is FP
NP[poly]-complete [11, Th. 3.5].
For every a ∈ A (resp. b ∈ B, c ∈ C), let #a (resp. #b, #c) denote the number of occurrences of
a (resp. b, c) in N : the number of triplets that contain a (resp. b, c). Let vN denote total
∑
t ∈N vt .
Elements ai ∈ A,bj ∈ B, ck ∈ C and triplets t ∈ N are identified with integers i, j,k ∈ [d] and
t ∈ [n].
We reduce this problem to the following instance of ParetoPartition for which finding a
Pareto efficient solution produces the optimum for the given Max3DM instance. SetW contains
8n integers that must be partitioned intom = n + 1 subsets (of various cardinalities). Given basis
β ∈ N≥2 and integer sequence (zi )i ∈N, we define integer 〈. . . z2 z1 z0〉 by
∑
i≥0 ziβ
i . Let β be an
integer large enough for such representation in basis β to never have carryovers, even when one
adds all the integers inW . Choosing β = max{30n3d,nvN }+1 largely satisfies this purpose. Let Σn
denote
∑n
t=1 t =
n(n+1)
2 . The integers in setW are represented below. For each t = (ai ,bj , ck ) ∈ N ,
there is a triplet-integerw(t). For each ai ∈ A, we introduce one actual-integer w(ai ) representing
the actual element intended to go with the triplets in a (partial) 3DM, and #ai −1 dummies, present
in triplets that are not in the 3DM. Similarly, we introduce #bj (resp. #ck ) integers for every bj ∈ B
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(resp. ck ∈ C). For each t ∈ N , there are four value-integers w(vt ). Target θ is below. We also
indicate values θ −w(t) which will be useful later.
z7 z6 z5 z4 z3 z2 z1 z0
∀t ∈N , w(t = (aibjck )) = 〈 3n−4 24n−15 −i −j −k 3Σn−t 3d+3n−3 vN 〉
∀ai ∈A,
one actual,
#ai−1 dum.
w(ai ) = 〈 1 1 i 0 0 0
1 (actual)
0 (dum.)
0 〉
∀bj ∈B,
one actual,
#bj−1 dum.
w(bj ) = 〈 1 2 0 j 0 0
1 (actual)
0 (dum.)
0 〉
∀ck ∈C,
one actual,
#ck−1 dum.
w(ck ) = 〈 1 4 0 0 k 0
1 (actual)
0 (dum.)
0 〉
∀t ∈N ,
“zero”
“one”
“two”
“three”
w(vt ) =
〈
1 8 0 0 0 t
0 (zero)
1 (one)
2 (two)
3 (three)
−vt
0
0
0
〉
Target θ = 〈 3n 24n 0 0 0 3Σn 3d + 3n 0 〉
Remark: θ −w(t) = 〈 4 15 i j k t 3 −vN 〉
Since every subset has same target θ , given a partition (Vi | i ∈ [m]) with deficits δ ∈ Z
m and
any permutation σ : [m] ↔ [m], deficits (δσ (i ) | i ∈ [m]) are also feasible by the permuted partition
(Vσ (i ) | i ∈ [m]). On every column but z0, total offer (weights) equates total demand (targets). For
instance, on column z1, it holds that n(3d + 3n − 3) + 3d + 6n = (n + 1)(3d + 3n).
Given any maximal 3DM N ′ ⊆ N , one can make partitions such that for one arbitrary subset
V(∗) deficit is δ(∗) = −
∑
t ∈N \N ′ vt and for the n other subsets V(t ) deficit is δ(t ) = 0, as follows:
• For every t = (ai ,bj , ck ) ∈ N
′, we make a subset V(t ) that contains w(t), the three actuals
w(ai ),w(bj),w(ck ) and integer w(vt ) “zero”. Integers w(vt ) “one, two and three” are sent to
V(∗) without the −vt deficit from “zero”.
• For every t = (ai ,bj , ck ) ∈ N \N
′, we make a subsetV(t ) that containsw(t), actual or dummy
integersw(ai ),w(bj ),w(ck );
13 and, if subset V(t ) contains resp. one, two or three dummies,
14
integerw(vt ) respectively “one, two or three”. The other integersw(vt )which include deficit
−vt are sent to V(∗).
From any optimal 3DM N ′ and i ∈ [m], let δopt(i ) be the deficit vector δ
opt(i )
i = −
∑
t ∈N \N ′ vt
and δ
opt(i )
−i ≡ 0
15 where V(∗) = Vi . Below, we show that this family ofm deficit vectors dominate
all the others, hence are the only Pareto efficient ones. The idea is that every subset Vi (which
objective is to maximize δi up to zero), has a column-wise lexicographic preference on integers,
from heaviest column z7 (weight β
7) to the lowest z0 (weight β0). Indeed, since in each column
(but z0), total offer (weights) equates total demand (targets), an unbalanced partition is always
dominated: at efficiency, a column’s deficit is exactly zero and cannot overrun a lower one. And,
sums of integers inW never have carryovers from a column to a heavier one. By reasoning from z7
to z1, any partition which does not satisfy all the following conditions is clearly Pareto dominated
by some δopt(i ) because of one huge deficit in multiples of β on some component δi .
z7: No subset contains two triplet-integers. Therefore, n subsets (among m = n+ 1) can be
identified from the triplet-integerw(t) contained byV(t ); and we identify the last one byV(∗).
13A complete 3DM may not exist. A partial 3DM may leave some actuals in N \ N ′.
14By maximality of N ′, zero dummies is not possible.
15Given a vector δ ∈ Zn+1 and i ∈ [n + 1], δ−i ∈ Z
n denotes the same vector where the ith component is removed.
Anisse Ismaili 8
These subsets can be ordered indifferently. For a subset V(t ), remaining deficit θ −w(t) is:
θ(t ) = 〈4 15 i j k t 3 −vN 〉
Thus, subsets V(t ) must contain four other integers to cancel the deficit 4 at z
7. Then, V(∗)
must contain the remainder of the n integers; the deficit on column z7 becomes 0.
z6: SubsetV(∗) contains 3n value-integersw(vt ), so its value at z
6 be 24n (i.e., no deficit). Subsets
V(t ) must contain one of each in integersw(a),w(b),w(c) andw(v) to cancel deficit 15 at z
6.
z5–z2: To cancel deficits from z5 to z2, for t = (ai ,bj , ck ) ∈N , subset V(t ) contains precisely one
of each in integers w(ai ), w(bj ), w(ck ), and w(vt ). Also, V(∗) has deficit 3
∑
n at β
2. Thus, it
needs exactly three w(vt ) of every triplet t to cancel the deficit, otherwise some V(t ) would
be missing his.
z1–z0: Again, due to tightness of offer on demand for z1, subset V(t ) must contain either (i)
three actual elements and integerw(vt ) “zero” or (ii) one, two or three dummy elements and
integer w(vt ) respectively “one, two or three”. In case (i), integers w(vt ) one, two and three
go toV(∗) without degrading it. In case (ii), three integersw(vt ) which include integerw(vt )
“zero” go to V(∗) and degrade it by −vt .
All in all, Pareto efficiency constrains partitions to structure as in themapping from a 3-dimensional
matching N ′ given above: the only possible Pareto efficient deficit vectors are δopt(i ) for i ∈
[m] and thus provide the optimum for Max3DM. Consequently, this reduction is metric. Since
weighted Max3DM is FPNP[poly]-hard [11], so is ParetoPartition. Since unweighted Max3DM
is FPNP[log]-hard and for vt ∈ {0, 1} no integer exceeds polynomial β
8, ParetoPartition is also
strongly FPNP[log]-hard. 
Lemma 2.7. If the numbers in problem ParetoPartition are polynomially bounded, then the re-
duction ParetoPartition ≤p SPR/Nw/Find holds.
Proof. We reduce any instanceW = {w1, . . . ,w |W |},m ∈ N, θ ∈ N of ParetoPartition to an
instance of SPR/Nw/Find. There arem projects p1, . . . ,pm ; for every project pi there is a disjoint
set of θ students who consider onlypi acceptable (and reciprocally). Projectpi ranks these students
arbitrarily. Resources R are identified with setW : any resource is compatible with any project and
qR = (w1, . . . ,w |W |). Crucially, with numbers in ParetoPartition polynomially bounded, there
are only polynomially many students.
Computing a nonwasteful matching (Y , µ) outputs a partitionV1, . . . ,Vm ≡ µ
−1(p1), . . . , µ
−1(pm)
with Pareto efficient deficits. Indeed, by definition, a claiming pair would exist if and only if there
was an allocation (resp. partition) where the number of unmatched students per project (resp.
deficit vector) Pareto dominated the “deficit vector” of allocation/partition V1, . . . ,Vm . 
2.2 The Complexity of Stability
Amatching that is both nonwasteful and fair (i.e., stable) may not exist. In this section, we settle the
complexity of deciding whether such a matching exists in a given SPR as NPNP-complete, which
is strictly more intractable than NP-complete.
Theorem2.8. SPR/Stable/Verif is coNP-complete, even if students only have one acceptable project.
Proof. The construct is the same as for SPR/Nw/Verif. Assuming that in the given matching
project pm+2 has its mθ +m − 1 top-preferred students, the concept of an envious pair becomes
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empty in this construction; hence stability amounts to nonwastefulness. Therefore, the same proof
holds. 
Theorem 2.9. SPR/Stable/Exist is NPNP-complete.
Proof. A stablematching is a yes-certificate verifiable byNP-oracle (Theorem2.8); hence, SPR/Stable/Exist
belongs to NPNP. Hardness follows from Lemmas 2.10 and 2.11 below. 
Lemma 2.10. ∀∃-4-Partition is strongly coNPNP-hard.
Proof. Let any instance of ∀∃-3DM be defined by finite sets A,B,C with |A| = |B | = |C | = d
and two disjoint triplet sets M ,N ⊆ A × B ×C , with |M | = n′ and |N | = n. This decision problem
asks the following question:
∀M ′ ⊆ M , ∃N ′ ⊆ N , M ′ ∪ N ′ is a 3DM,
where “M ′ ∪ N ′ is a 3DM” means that any element of A ∪ B ∪ C occurs exactly once in M ′ ∪ N ′.
This is a coNPNP-complete problem [26]. For every ai ∈ A (resp. bj ∈ B, ck ∈ C), let #ai (resp. #bj ,
#ck ) denote the number of occurrences of ai (resp. bj , ck ) in M ∪ N : how many triplets contain ai
(resp. bj , ck )? We identify elements and triplets with integers i, j,k ∈ [d] and t ∈ [n
′
+ n].
We reduce this instance to the following ∀∃-4-Partition instance. ListW contains the 4(n′+n)
integers depicted below in basis β = 4(n′ + n)d + 1 (definition in proof of Lemma 2.6). For every
triplet t = (ai ,bj , ck ) ∈ M ∪ N , there is one “triplet” integer w(ai ,bj , ck ) ∈ N. For every element
a ∈ A, we introduce one actual integer w(a) that represents the actual element intended to go
with the triplets in the 3DM and #a − 1 dummies that will go with the triplets that are not in the
3-dimensional matching. Similarly, we introduce #b integers for each b ∈ B and #c integers for
each c ∈ C . Target θ = 4β5 + 15β4 is also depicted below. Numbers are polynomially bounded by
β6.
∀t ∈ M , w(t = (aibjck )) = 〈 1 1 −i −j −k 0 〉
∀ai ∈ A,
one actual
#ai−1 dum.
w(ai ) = 〈 1 2 i 0 0
−2 (actual)
0 (dummy)
〉
∀bj ∈ B,
one actual
#bj−1 dum.
w(bj ) = 〈 1 4 0 j 0
+1 (actual)
0 (dummy)
〉
∀ck ∈ C,
one actual
#ck−1 dum.
w(ck ) = 〈 1 8 0 0 k
+1 (actual)
0 (dummy)
〉
target θ = 〈 4 15 0 0 0 0 〉
List L has length ℓ = |M |: every triplet t = (ai ,bj , ck ) ∈ M is reduced to couple utvt between
“triplet” integer ut = w(ai ,bj , ck ) and “actual” integer vt = w(ai ).
First, since β is large enough, and column-wise offer (weights) equates demand (targets), ad-
ditions in W never have carryovers. Therefore, subsets must hit the target on each column of
this representation. Consequently, in any 4-partition ofW , there are four elements, one of each
in the following: “triplet” integers, element-a integers, element-b integers and element-c integers.
Moreover, “triplet” integer w(ai ,bj , ck ) is with “its” elements w(ai ), w(bj ) and w(ck ). Also, actual
elements must be in the same subset and dummies in the others. Therefore, any 3-dimensional
matching M ′ ∪ N ′ is in correspondence with such a 4-partition. Validity follows from the corre-
spondence betweenM ′ (taking or not elements in M) and σ (enforcing integers w(t) for t ∈ M in
the same subsets as its actual elementsw(ai ) and the two others.)
(yes⇒yes) Assume the 3DM instance is a yes one, and let σ : [ℓ] → {0, 1} be any couple
enforcement/forbidding function. We construct a σ -satisfying 4-partition in correspondence with
the following 3-dimensional matching M ′ ∪ N ′: for t ∈ [ℓ] ≡M , triplet t is in M ′ if and only if
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p ′1 : sv1
...
p ′
ℓ
: svℓ
rv1 : v1
...
rvℓ : vℓ
sv1 : p
′
1 ≻ p1v1
...
...
svℓ : p
′
ℓ
≻ pℓvℓ
p1 : sv1 ≻ s1
...
pℓ : svℓ ≻ sℓ
s1 : p1θ −u1−v1
...
...
sℓ : pℓθ −uℓ−vℓ
pℓ+1 : sℓ+1
...
pm : sm
sℓ+1 : pℓ+1θ
...
...
sm : pmθ
{rw : w |w ∈W \L}
pa : sb ≻ sa
pb : sa ≻ sb
r1 : 1
sa : pa ≻ pb
sb : pb ≻ pa
∀
∃
yes/no
(number) students projects resources
Fig. 2. From ∀∃-4-Partition to co-SPR/Stable/Exist. Le-right arrows depict acceptable projects and right-
le arrows, compatible projects. Dashed arrows go to any project p1 . . .pm , but pj for resource rvj .
σ (t) = 1; then the assumption givesN ′ such thatM ′∪N ′ is a 3DM.We construct the corresponding
4-partition (see paragraph above), and it is σ -satisfying.
(yes⇐yes) Assume the partition instance is a yes one, and let us show that ∀M ′ ⊆ M ,∃N ′ ⊆ N
s.t. M ′ ∪ N ′ is a 3DM. Given M ′, let σ be defined as σ (t) = 1 if and only if t ∈ M ′. A σ -satisfying
4-partition exists, and is in correspondencewith some 3DMM ′∪N ′, by construction, as above. 
Lemma 2.11. ∀∃-4-Partition ≤p co-SPR/Stable/Exist
Proof. Given a ∀∃-4-Partition instance defined by m ∈ N, listW = {w1, . . . ,w4m}, target
θ ∈ N, and list of couples L = (u1,v1), . . . , (uℓ,vℓ) ofW , we construct a co-SPR/Stable/Exist
instance depicted in Figure 2. It contains:
• ℓ +m + 2 projects p ′1,p
′
2 . . . ,p
′
ℓ
, p1,p2, . . . ,pm and pa ,pb ,
• ℓ subsets of students sv1 , sv2 , . . . , svℓ where each subset svi containsvi students who all have
preference svi : p
′
i ≻ pi ≻ ∅,
• m subsets of students s1, s2, . . . , sℓ, sℓ+1, . . . , sm where each subset si for i ∈ [ℓ] contains
θ −ui −vi students, each subset si for i ∈ [ℓ + 1,m] contains θ students and in every subset
si students all have preference si : pi ≻ ∅, and
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• two students sa, sb who have preferences sa : pa ≻ pb ≻ ∅ and sb : pb ≻ pa ≻ ∅.
• For every i ∈ [ℓ], project p ′i has preference p
′
i : svi ≻ ∅, and project pi has preference
p ′i : svi ≻ si ≻ ∅. For every i ∈ [ℓ + 1,m], project pi has preference pi : si ≻ ∅. Project pa has
preference pa : sb ≻ sa and pb preference pb : sa ≻ sb (as in Example 1.10).
Since ∀∃-4-Partition is strongly hard, we can assume that its numbers are polynomially bounded
(e.g. w.r.t.m); hence, there is a polynomial number of students. There are |W | − ℓ + 1 resources:
• for every i ∈ [ℓ], resource rvi has capacity qrvi = vi and is compatible with {p
′
i }∪{pj | j , i},
• for every weight w ∈W \ L resource rw has capacity qrw = w and Trw = {p1, . . . ,pm}, and
• resource r1 has capacity qr1 = 1 and compatibilities Tr1 = {pa,pb } ∪ {p1, . . . ,pm}.
The idea is that capacity requirements of projectsp1, . . . ,pm model them targets of a 4-partition.
Since integers u1, . . . ,uℓ are inV1, . . . ,Vℓ, we already subtract them from p1, . . . ,pℓ . The universal
quantifier is encoded as follows.
σ (i)=1: Enforcing ui and vi together in a 4-partition will correspond to letting the capacity re-
quirement of project pi be θ −ui −vi (like if ui and vi were already inside): students svi are
matched with p ′i and resources rvi are allocated to p
′
i .
σ (i)=0: Conversely, forbidding ui andvi to be together in a 4-partition will correspond to trying
to match svi with pi , hence bringing its capacity requirement to θ − ui , while resource rvi
cannot be allocated to pi .
We are now set to formally prove the validity of this reduction.
(yes⇒yes) For each σ : [ℓ] → {0, 1}, there is a σ -satisfying 4-partition V1, . . . ,Vℓ,Vℓ+1, . . . ,Vm .
For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that there exists a stable matching (Y , µ). By definition,
for each resource rvi , i ∈ [ℓ], either (1) µ(rvi ) = p
′
i or (2) µ(rvi ) ∈ {pj | j , i}.
Let us consider a particular mapping σ defined by σ (i) = 1 if (1), and σ (i) = 0 if (2). By premise,
there exists a σ -satisfying 4-partition V1, . . . ,Vℓ,Vℓ+1, . . . ,Vm: for every i ∈ [ℓ], first ui ∈ Vi and
second vi ∈ Vi if and only if σ (i) = 1. From this σ -satisfying 4-partition, there exists an allocation
of {rvi | σ (i) = 0} and {rw | w ∈W \L} to projectsp1, . . . ,pm that makes feasible the full matching
Y (si ) = pi ,∀i ∈ [m] and Y (svi ) = pi ,∀i ∈ [m] s.t. σ (i) = 0. Therefore it would be wasteful to use
resource r1 on projects {p1, . . . ,pm}, contradicting stability, and consequently r1 is allocated to pa
or pb . The SPR defined by sa, sb ,pa,pb , r1 cannot be stable (as in Example 1.10). Consequently, a
stable matching is impossible.
(no⇒no) Assume that there exists a mapping σ such that no σ -satisfying 4-partition exists, and
let us build a stable matching (Y , µ) as follows. For every i ∈ [ℓ]:
• if σ (i) = 1, then Y (svi ) = {p
′
i } and µ(rvi ) = p
′
i ;
• if σ (i) = 0, then Y (svi ) = {pi } and µ(rvi ) ∈ {pj | j,i}.
Then, we allocate the other resources ({rw | w ∈ W \ L} and r1) in a way that minimizes the
number of unmatched students in s1, . . . , sm .
The students from sv1 , . . . , svℓ cannot be involved in a claiming (or envious) pair since they ob-
tain their top choice if matched to p ′i , and one claiming pair from pi to p
′
i would deprive p1, . . . ,pm
from resource rvi (not allocated to pi ), which is not feasible. Since the number of unmatched stu-
dents in s1, . . . , sm is minimized, one more seat is not possible. Since no σ -satisfying 4-partition
exists, without resource r1, some projects in p1, . . . ,pm would loose a seat. Then r1 cannot be re-
allocated to pa or pb without canceling a seat. The remaining SPR defined by sa , sb ,pa,pb has no
resource at all and is therefore stable. 
Anisse Ismaili 12
3 RELATED WORK
This paper follows a stream of works dealing with constrained matching. Two-sided matching
has been attracting considerable attention from AI and TCS researchers [3, 17, 18, 22]. A stan-
dard market deals with maximum quotas, i.e., capacity limits that cannot be exceeded. However,
many real-world matching markets are subject to a variety of distributional constraints [24], in-
cluding regional maximum quotas, which restrict the total number of students assigned to a set of
schools [21], minimum quotas, which guarantee that a certain number of students are assigned to
each school [8, 12, 16, 29, 30], and diversity constraints [6, 14, 23, 25]. Other works examine the
computational complexity for finding a matching with desirable properties under distributional
constraints, including [4, 7, 15]. A similar model was recently considered [20], but with a com-
pact representation scheme which handles exponentially many students and induces intrinsically
different computational problems.
There exist several works on three-sided matching problems [2, 19, 27] where three types of
players/agents, e.g., males, females, and pets, are matched. Although their model might look su-
perficially similar to our model, they are fundamentally different. In the student-project allocation
problem [1], students are matched to projects, while each project is offered by a lecturer. A stu-
dent has a preference over projects, and a lecturer has a preference over students. Each lecturer
has her capacity limit. This problem can be considered as a standard two-sided matching problem
with distributional constraints. More specifically, this problem is equivalent to a two-sided match-
ing problem with regional maximum quotas [24]. A 3/2-approximation algorithm exists for the
student-project allocation problem [5], and one can also obtain super-stability, despite ties [28].
In our model, a resource is not an agent/player; it has no preference over projects/students. Also,
a project/student has no preference over resources; a project just needs to be allocated enough
resources to accommodate applying students.
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